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Abstract: The role of Montenegro in the First World War was particularly interesting for the 
Yugoslav question. The Balkan country, which had long been the center of Slav irredentism, 
became in fact during the conflict the object of Belgrade’s expansionist ambitions. 
The Montenegrin identity ended in large part to blend in with the broader Yugoslav project 
although some groups remained loyal to King Nikola Petrović-Njegoš and to the idea of an 
independent Montenegro. While France was in favor of Belgrade, Italy still tried to support 
Nikola, as far as the real situation on the ground made it difficult to provide real support to the 
realists. 
The question was actually connected to the rivalry for controlling the Adriatic Sea. In the last 
months of WWI Montenegro had little chance to maintain its independence, an evidence 
reinforced by the presence of Serbian troops in all key areas of the country. Notwithstanding, in 
early 1919 the Italians were still trying to use the Montenegrin issue to embarrass Belgrade. 
While King Nikola was still in exile in Paris, anti-Serbian groups were organizing in Cetinje, 
staging royalist demonstrations eventually repressed by force by the Yugoslav Army. The clashes 
that took place in Montenegro in this period, albeit limited, demonstrated the existence of a 
Montenegrin national identity in front of the new Yugoslav project, providing as well an 
interesting insight into the plans and ambitions of the Great Powers. 
Keywords: Montenegro, National Identity, First World War, Yugoslavia, Italy 
Towards War: The July Crisis 
In Nineteenth century, the Petrović Njegoš family succeeded in transforming Montenegro into a 
secular principality that in 1878, with the Treaty of Berlin, was internationally recognized as an 
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independent state, becoming the centre of Slavic struggle against the Ottoman Empire. Under 
Nikola I Montenegro was also granted its first constitution in 1905 and was elevated to the rank 
of kingdom in 1910. In the Balkan Wars, of which Montenegro was one of the instigators, the 
country did make important territorial gains by splitting the Sanjak of Novi Pazar with Serbia, 
although the city of Shkodra, captured by Montenegrin forces, had to be given up to the new 
established Albania at the insistence of the Powers. 
The events of the summer of 1914, with the emergence of the Austro-Serbian crisis, prompted 
European diplomacy to face the problem of the future of Montenegro as well. The issue was also 
discussed by the Italian Foreign Minister, Antonino di San Giuliano, and the German 
Ambassador to Rome, Johannes von Flotow, on 8 July. In reaction to a possible union of Serbia 
and Montenegro, Flotow envisaged an Austrian attack on Mount Lovćen, to which San Giuliano 
objected, believing such an action unlikely as long as King Nikola of Montenegro was still alive. 
Indeed, only the complex events of the looming conflict were to offer the conditions for the 
union of the two Slavic states.1 In the following hours, the Italian Foreign Minister informed the 
governments of Cetinje, Belgrade and Petersburg of the risk of an Austro-Hungarian attack on 
Lovćen, showing itself willing to discuss the union of Serbia and Montenegro, obviously linking 
it to possible compensations for Italy in unredeemed lands.2 In fact, as San Giuliano knew, 
Nikola had no intention of ending up in the deadly embrace of the Serbs and when the king, 
especially in the past, had thought of a union, he had always conceived it under his leadership, 
not certainly that of the Karađorđević.  
The deterioration of the diplomatic situation over the course of July 1914 made in any case 
secondary the Serbian-Montenegrin issue, revealing rather clearly the impending European 
conflict. The Cetinje government for its part, while pandering to the sentiments of the 
population, was careful in demonstrating its distance from any action of Serbian nationalism 
                                                          
1 On the issue of a Serbian-Montenegrin union before the Great War, see D.D. Vujović, Ujedinjenje Cnra Gore i 
Srbije, Istoriski Institut Narodne Republike Crne Gore, Titograd 1962; H. Heilbronner, The Merger Attemps of 
Serbia and Montenegro, Journal of Central European Affairs, XVIII/3, 1958, pp. 281-291. 
2 Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (DDI), Quarta Serie, vol. XII, doc. 124. See F. Caccamo, Il Montenegro negli anni 
della prima guerra mondiale, Aracne, Ariccia 2008, pp. 17-21. 
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against Austria-Hungary, showing even willing to take a line in favor of Vienna in exchange for 
clear concessions to the security and independence of Montenegro and his dynasty.3  
Meanwhile many in Rome followed with concern the developments in Montenegrin politics, 
especially since both hypotheses on the future of the country, union with Serbia or alignment to 
Austria-Hungary, would represent a threat to Italians interests in the Balkans. Austrian action on 
Lovćen or its possible voluntary transfer, were in fact an issue for Italian diplomacy.4 For this 
reason, it is not surprising that San Giuliano counseled the Montenegrins to stay out of the whole 
matter, defending their neutrality so as not to provide a pretext for an Austrian military operation 
on Lovćen, and above all, warning Cetinje not to undertake any adventure in northern Albania.5  
The Montenegrin public opinion was, however, absolutely pro-Serb and the crisis between 
Vienna and Belgrade could not leave unaffected the Cetinje government. On the other hand, 
Italian pressure on Austrian allies to avert the attack on Lovćen seemed for the moment to work.6 
But there was the fear that in one way or another Mount Lovćen were occupied by the Austrians, 
without Italy could get anything in return, an eventuality fraught with dangerous consequences, 
especially for the negative impact it would have on Italian public opinion.7  
Relations between Vienna and Cetinje worsened significantly since July 26, making it possible 
for King Nikola to reopen the talks with Belgrade in anti-Austrian function.8 With the outbreak 
of the conflict, several pro-Serb demonstrations took place in Montenegro, and the government 
ordered mobilization. Then, fearing the Serbian expansionism on the Adriatic, the Italian 
diplomacy tried to convince Montenegro to remain neutral, also looking to involve in this action 
the other powers.9 In fact there were not at this stage, however, many chances to influence the 
                                                          
3 Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., p. 22; N. Rakočević, Les relations entre le Monténégro et l’Autriche-Hongrie, in J.R. 
Bojović (éd.), Le Monténégro dans les relations internationales, Institut d’Histoire de la R.S. de Monténégro, 
Titograd 1984, pp. 55-71. 
4 DDI, Quarta Serie, vol. XII, doc. 274, 401. 
5 Ivi, docs. 419, 439. More generally, on the relations between Italy and Montenegro in this period see A. Biagini, I 
negoziati tra l’Italia e il Montenegro durante la prima guerra mondiale (1914-1918), Rassegna Storica del 
Risorgimento, 1981/4, pp. 443-458. 
6 Ivi, docs. 384, 507, 532. 
7 Ivi, docs. 565, 575. 
8 Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., pp. 24-25. See also Treadway J.D., The Falcon and the Eagle. Montenegro and 
Austria-Hungary 1908-1914, Purdue University Press, West Lafaiette 1983. 
9 DDI, Quarta Serie, vol. XII, doc. 609, 686. 
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conduct of Montenegro.10 The issue went on in the following days, representing a non-secondary 
element of Italy’s diplomatic position. As a matter of fact, Montenegro and Lovćen in particular, 
served to reiterate the never forgotten criterion of compensation in the Balkans to which Italian 
diplomacy continued to remain faithful.11 
Montenegro at War 
On 28 July 1914, the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia made it necessary to find a 
concrete strategy to ensure the defense of the interests of Montenegro and perhaps its very 
survival. Due to Montenegrin public opinion, although Vienna had tried to maintain Montenegrin 
neutrality, promising the transfer of Shkodra and parts of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, King Nikola 
could not avoid siding with Serbia, declaring war on Austria-Hungary on 6 August.12 This small 
Balkan country could not pass undamaged through a large conflict, despite the dedication and 
capabilities of its aggressive, albeit poorly armed, army. Isolated by the blockade immediately 
imposed by the Austro-Hungarian fleet and dramatically short of everything, especially money, 
the country then addressed Entente for support, and in order to coordinate the action of the two 
Slavic allies, the Serbian general Bozidar Janković assumed command of their forces. The 
Montenegrins thus accepted, on Russian insistence, the arrival of some Serbian officers who 
assumed the control of the General Staff. Montenegrin forces were allegedly to concentrate 
towards Bosnia, focusing on Sarajevo and renouncing to actions towards coastal areas.13 
However, since the beginning disagreements emerged between Serbs and Montenegrins in the 
conduct of the operations, Cetinje especially disliked the obvious attempt by Serbia to unite and 
actually control the two armies, eliminating any autonomy. This explains well the reason of the 
mutual and reiterated criticism, and the will of King Nikola and his government not to engage in 
Bosnia and focus instead on their traditional Adriatic goals.14 Montenegro, however, could not 
expect much support from the Entente, as evidenced by the behavior of the small French military 
                                                          
10 Ivi, doc. 652. San Giuliano insisted on the serious consequences for the Italian public opinion of a conflict 
between Vienna and Cetinje, as well as any solution of the question of Lovćen. Ivi, docs. 686, 790. 
11 See Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., pp. 27-30. 
12 Documents Diplomatique Français (DDF), 1914, Tome I, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Imprimerie 
Nationale, Paris 1997, doc. 513. 
13 A. Mitrović, Serbia’s Great War, 1914–1918, Hurst, London 2007, pp. 138-141. 
14 DDF, 1914 Tome I, docs. 315, 323, 412. Quoted also in Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., p. 33. 
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mission, which adopted Serbia’s strategy, by refusing for example to support Montenegrin plans, 
indeed quite ambitious, for an attack on Kotor.15 
The Austro-Hungarians had meanwhile deployed a new Corps against Montenegro, whose main 
task was to prevent the connection between the enemy armies. These troops, however, were 
halted, while from the top of Mount Lovćen Montenegrins even managed to bomb Kotor. 
Austrian troops were able to occupy only Pljevlja while in turn the Montenegrins occupied small 
portions of enemy territory, then succeeding in taking Pljevlja after the Battle of Cer. In this 
period, San Giuliano continued to be interested in Montenegro, considering that Italy could gain 
both in the case of an Austro-Hungarian victory, on the basis of the principle of compensation, 
either by siding alongside the Entente, in the case of an Austrian collapse. Nevertheless, the 
Italians did not want the Montenegrins seizing Shkodra, and Rome officially warned the Cetinje 
government that such an action would not be tolerated.16 At the end of 1914 the withdrawal of 
the international contingent from Shkodra, where it had been deployed after the Balkan Wars, 
created many concerns in Italy, where it was feared that the Montenegrins, encouraged by the 
Entente, could occupy the city. This risk increased with the final collapse of the short-lived 
authority of William of Wied in Albania. Thus, while the Italians were thinking of a landing in 
Vlorë, King Nikola was working to create the conditions for an action in the area of Shkodra and 
Shëngjin.17 
The actual occupation of Vlorë created a state of agitation by fomenting the expansionist 
ambitions of the Balkan countries, so that the Entente governments decided to send a note to 
Athens, Cetinje and Niš to request a formal commitment not to engage in further occupations of 
Albanian territory.18 
In the negotiations between Italy and the Entente, the interests of Cetinje did not find much 
space, and the future of Montenegro was generally subordinated, especially by Russian Foreign 
                                                          
15 Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères (AMAE), Guerre Mondiale, 322, Ambassade de Russie à Delcassé, 
note du 23 Septembre, 1914; 323, Delaroche-Vernet à Delcassé, Cetinje 27 janvier 1915. 
16 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. I, doc. 144. Montenegrins, however, were not willing to give up Shkodra, ivi, doc. 331.  
17 Ivi, docs. 756, 768, 856. See also Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., pp. 39-46. The French government opposed to 
any Montenegrin action in northern Albania for not jeopardizing the relations with Rome. DDF, 1914, doc. 464. 
18 DDF, 1915, Tome I, doc. 80. On the relations between Italy and Montenegro with respect to the Albanian 
question see D.R. Živojnović, Italia i Crna Gora 1914-1925. Studija o izneverenom savezništvu, Službeni List SPJ, 
Sarajevo 1989, pp. 49-74. 
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Minister Sazonov, to the defense of Serbian war aims. As a matter of fact, San Giuliano’s 
proposals made no reference to Montenegro in case of a partition of Albania.19 This is not the 
case to repeat the stages leading up to the Treaty of London, on which so much has been written 
over the years. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that when Sonnino replaced di San 
Giuliano, eventually Montenegro found space in diplomatic negotiations between the Powers. 
The Italian declaration of war on Austria-Hungary was greeted enthusiastically in Montenegro, 
where the majority of the population believed that this represented the end of the blockade 
imposed by the enemy.20 But there was also the fear, particularly among the Serbs, that the 
Italians could jeopardize Serbia’s interests in the region.21 In fact, the Serbs immediately began 
to put pressure on Montenegrins, making clear that any collaboration between Italy and 
Montenegro would have to receive prior approval from the Serbian Government.22 The real 
obstacle to cooperation between the two countries, however, was because of the Albanian 
question, not having Montenegrins given up their ambitions on Shkodra, which Cetinje wanted 
to accomplish as soon as possible.23 This added to Serbian operations in central Albania, that the 
Serbian HQ was preparing to launch between May and June 1915, apparently to prevent Italy 
from blocking Serbia’s expansionism in this region. The Serbs, acting in Albania renounced to 
offensive operations on the Bosnian front, creating a state of evident malaise in relations with 
Rome, and endangering the agreements reached between the Allies.24 Meanwhile, there was 
growing tension between Albanians and Montenegrins, and the Cetinje government thought to 
follow Serbia’s example.25 Not unexpectedly, among those who opposed Montenegrin action in 
Albania there was the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić, who intended to counter any 
autonomous and expansionist Montenegrin policy, thereby fueling the doubts of the King and the 
                                                          
19 Ivi, doc. 201. For the role of Montenegro in the discussions leading up to the Treaty of London cfr. Živojnović, 
Italia i Crna Gora, cit., pp. 77-96. 
20 The block represented the main problem for the Montenegrin government. DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. IV, doc. 19. 
DDF, 1915, Tome II, doc. 3 
21 DDF, 1915, Tome II, doc. 3. Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., pp. 66-67. 
22 AMAE, Guerre Mondiale, 322, Delaroche-Vernet à Delcassé, Cetinje, 5 giugno 1915. 
23 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. III, docs. 716, 733. 
24 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. IV, doc. 188; DDF, 1915, Tome I, doc. doc. 572.; cfr. anche Sonnino, Diario, cit., vol. II, 
p. 162.  
25 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. IV, doc. 19; DDF, 1915, Tome II, doc. 1. 
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Montenegrin government towards Serbia.26 However, on 11 June 1915, Montenegrin troops 
entered Albanian territory, eventually reaching Mount Taraboš, near Shkodra.27 
Despite a British attempt to send Cetinje a joint statement against the occupation of Shkodra, 
Montenegrin troops continued to threaten the city, occupying Lezhë and Shëngjin as well. On 23 
June, the Allied governments officially asked the Montenegrins not to make further operations 
without informing the Serbian HQ.28 Notwithstanding, on 27 June Shkodra fell to the 
Montenegrins.29 Only then it was actually delivered the Allied note, which however did not 
produce any result. What was sure were Italian disappointment and the fear, nurtured in some 
circles, that Montenegro was now thinking to align to Austria-Hungary.30  
In the following weeks, France and Russia continued to have an ambiguous attitude towards 
Montenegro, while Italy and Great Britain did not spare criticism. The occupation of Shkodra 
also led to the waiver by the Italians to supply Montenegro, although Rome continued to defend 
the principle of Montenegrin independence in the face of Serbian claims.31 
Meanwhile, Montenegrin forces limited themselves to maintain their positions, without risking 
their scarce resources, thereby fueling the rumors about an upcoming surrender or even a 
desertion to the enemy.32 In support of Serbs and Montenegrins, the Entente decided to send 
supplies across the Adriatic.33 This solution also ensured Serbia’s interests in Montenegro, 
because it was established that the Italians would not have given access to Montenegrin ports.34 
The new Austro-Hungarian offensive in the fall of 1915 and Bulgaria’s declaration of war 
marked the fate of Serbia, whose forces, to prevent the encirclement were forced to a general 
retreat toward the sea, through Montenegro and Albania. Amidst great difficulties about 125,000 
                                                          
26 Ivi, docs. 141, 163, 175. In this regard, it is particularly interesting the outburst of Nicola with his son in law 
Vittorio Emanuele III, by these reported to Sonnino on June 11. Ivi, doc. 153. 
27 Ivi, doc. 184; DDF, 1915, Tome II, docs. 105, 130. Cfr. anche Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., pp. 72-73. 
28 DDF, 1915, Tome II, doc. 151. 
29 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. IV, doc. 290.  
30 Ivi, docs. 300, 305; DDF, 1915, Tome II, doc. 188. AMAE, Guerre Mondiale, 323, Bertie à Delcassé, Parigi 17 
luglio 1915. For the consequences of the occupation of Shkodra see Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., pp. 75-84. 
31 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. IV, doc. 230; Sonnino, Diario, cit., vol. II, pp. 162-163. On Italian support to Montenegrin 
independence see DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. IV, docs. 442, 453, 475. 
32 See Živojnović, Italia i Crna Gora, cit., pp. 165-192. As for the rumors on the Cetinje government’s intentions, 
DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. V, doc. 11. 
33 DDF, 1915, Tome III, docs. 387, 573; Sonnino, Carteggio, cit., vol. II, doc. 440, 456. 
34 AMAE, Guerre Mondiale, 323, Delaroche-Vernet à Briand, Cetinje 22 novembre e 4 dicembre 1915. 
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Serbs finally reached the Adriatic coast being boarded on Italian ships and transferred to Corfu.35 
The Montenegrin Army gave its support to cover the Serbian retreat; nevertheless, unpleasant 
episodes were recorded, such as looting.36 In addition, the situation created by the arrival of the 
Serbs only served to further fuel the doubts against the conduct of the Montenegrin 
government.37 The transfer of Serbs in the island of Corfu also led to a new unknown factor on 
the future of Montenegro. In the parliamentary session of 25 December 1915, there were many 
who pronounced themselves in favor of a separate peace; this caused the resignation of the Prime 
Minister, General Vukotić, replaced by Lazar Mijušković. Montenegro, probably waiting to 
figure out Austro-Hungarian’s plan, however, continued to declare loyal to the allies, even if 
Cetinje was unable to completely dispel the doubts about its real intentions. While the Entente 
was discussing the possibility of providing adequate assistance to the Balkan country, on 7 
January 1916, the Austrian attack on Lovćen began.38 The next day the enemy conquered the 
crest of Bobotov Kuk, approaching the conquest of Mount Lovćen, while also in areas where the 
Montenegrins had fought successfully, as in the Battle of Mojkovac, the defenders began to show 
signs of weakness deeming a defeat imminent. The moral collapse of Montenegro was now 
therefore clear.39 
It was at this point, while the last Serbian troops were embarking to Corfu, that King Nikola 
announced to the representatives of the Entente his intention to move to Podgorica. The 
following day the Prime Minister made known the decision to call for a truce. The harsh 
conditions required by the Austro-Hungarians, however, made it impossible for their acceptance 
by the sovereign, although Mijušković was in favor of pursuing the negotiations.40 
The result of the discussions within the Montenegrin leadership was the telegram of 13 January, 
by which the King asked directly to Francis Joseph “an honorable and dignified peace”.41 A 
                                                          
35 Mitrović, Serbia’s Great War, cit., pp. 151-161. 
36 Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., pp. 89-90. 
37 AMAE, Guerre Mondiale, 323, Delaroche-Vernet à Briand, Cetinje 20, 25, 26 dicembre 1915; DDF, 1915, Tome 
III, doc. 608; 
38 On the possible aid to Montenegro and specifically on the possible Italian contribution see DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. 
V, doc. 275. 
39 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. V, doc. 179. See also Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., pp. 93-94. 
40 In fact, on the same line as the head of the government there was also Prince Mirko, the second son of Nikola. 
DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. V, doc. 308. 
41 Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., pp. 97-98. 
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gesture that nonetheless proved useless given the determination of the Austro-Hungarians to 
obtain a total victory. This led to the decision to transfer the Court and Government to Shkodra 
and then, on 17 January a request for assistance to the Italian Navy for the evacuation of the 
government and the royal family.42 Nevertheless, for a few days Mijušković seemed willing to 
reach an understanding with the Austro-Hungarians. Only 20 January 1916 Nikola definitively 
rejected Vienna’s requests, agreeing to evacuate at least part of the government.43 Fled the 
country, Nicola went into exile in France where he remained for the duration of the war. 
The French Exile of King Nikola 
In France, Mijušković undertook the difficult task of reorganizing a government recognizable as 
rightful by the Entente, not to permanently undermine the already difficult position of 
Montenegro. Rebuild the credibility of the government, however, did not prove easy. The doubts 
and rumors in the previous months and the steady Serbian propaganda in fact already started to 
marginalize King Nikola and his representatives, thus crediting the Yugoslavist ideal.44 The 
attempt to organize and deploy to the front a Montenegrin voluntary force failed as well.45 The 
government in exile was in fact now isolated and despite the ups and downs of the war, this fact 
was not to change. 
At the end of April 1916 King Nikola tried to shake up relations with the Allies, replacing 
Mijušković with Andrija Radović; a decision no doubt influenced by the pressures of the Russian 
and French diplomacies, interested in the revival of Serbian-Montenegrin relations.46 The 
appointment of Radović was also welcomed in Rome, where the new Prime Minister had held 
the position of Montenegrin representative.47 It is important to note that Italy, while continuing to 
have doubts about the reliability of the Montenegrin government, were the only power really 
interested in defending the independence of the country, and not coincidentally, Rome was also 
                                                          
42 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. V, doc. 338. 
43 Actually in Montenegro remained Prince Mirko and some ministers; the decision, however, caused many 
suspicions about the real intentions of Nicola. As for the military evacuated, these were nearly 1,700. 
44 Živojnović, Italia i Crna Gora, cit., pp. 193-269; Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., pp. 101-144. 
45 The failure to form a Montenegrin force will prove a serious handicap for the future of the country, see 
Živojnović, Italia i Crna Gora, cit., p. 249. 
46 However, there were no formal requests to that effect. AMAE, Guerre Mondiale, 325, Briand à Delaroche-Vernet, 
Paris 5, 6 maggio 1916; DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. V, doc. 808. 
47 Ivi, doc. 849. 
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ready to support the attempt to organize armed resistance to the occupiers;48 an interest, however, 
received with great concern by the Serbs and their French supporters.49 Moreover, aware of the 
risks for Italy’s Balkan ambitions due to Serbia’s intention to annex Montenegro, Sonnino tried 
to avoid taking too rigid a line.50 
The Montenegrin situation became increasingly difficult, and in August came news of a plan 
prepared by Radović, without informing the king, for union with Serbia on the basis of a dynastic 
alternation formula.51 Thus Sonnino ordered the Italian ambassadors in the allied capitals to 
officially ask the governments with which they were accredited, what were their intentions in 
respect of Montenegro.52 The answers were not encouraging, however, for France and Russia 
clearly sided with the Serbs and the British believed the Balkan country actually unable to 
sustain itself.53 
In the second half of 1916, the Montenegrin government moved from his temporary seat of 
Bordeaux to Neuilly and it was here, in the following autumn, that erupted the crisis between the 
pro-independence faction and the Unionists; a crisis however, ably managed by King Nikola 
with the resignation of Radović and the formation of a new government headed by Milo 
Matanović.54 The event also reminded the Italian diplomacy that the danger of absorption of 
Montenegro into a Greater Serbia was still relevant, also because Pašić was determined to use the 
opportunity offered by the war to stop King Nikola to return home.55 The king was in fact an 
obstacle to unionist plans and not surprisingly, in the same period circulated rumors about plots 
to eliminate the Montenegrin dynasty.56 
                                                          
48 Ivi, docs. 153, 178. An attempt however, that will end up with the rapid failure of the insurgents. See Mitrović, 
Serbia’s Great War, cit., pp. 245-246 e 265-267. 
49 AMAE, Guerre Mondiale, 326, Delaroche-Vernet à Briand, Bordeaux 13 e 24 giugno 1916; Briand à Cambon, 
Paris 17 giugno 1916. 
50 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. V, docs. 62, 176. 
51 Ivi, docs. 248, 323. 
52 Ivi, docs. 387, 399. 
53 It should be remembered that Boris Stürmer, Sazonov’s successor as Foreign Minister, was more inclined to grant 
some of these chances to Montenegro. Ivi, docs. 294, 420. 
54 Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., pp. 135-136. 
55 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. VII, docs. 110, 122. AMAE, Guerre Mondiale, 329, Delaroche-Vernet à Briand, Neuilly 
12 e 20 gennaio 1917. 
56 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. VII, doc. 700. AMAE, Guerre Mondiale, 330, Boppe à Briand, Corfou 13 maggio 1917. 
Cfr. anche Mitrović, Serbia’s Great War, cit., p. 283; Caccamo, Il Montenegro, cit., p. 137. 
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However, crushed by the weight of the unionist issue, Matanović did not remain Prime Minister 
for long, being soon replaced by Evgenje Popović. Meanwhile, the episode of the proclamation 
of Gjirokastra and the prospect of an Italian support for the independence of Albania caused a 
crisis in relations with Rome.57 
The Yugoslavist Movement 
At this point it seems necessary to mention briefly the role played by the Serbs. On the definition 
of their postwar plans it had undoubtedly an important place the US declaration of war and the 
willingness expressed by Wilson for the Yugoslav idea.58 This fact contributed to urge the 
Serbian government to open serious discussions with Croatian and Slovenian representatives. 
After the first contacts in Switzerland with the Yugoslav exiles, Pašić proposed a conference in 
Corfu to discuss the principles of a future Yugoslav state.59 
The idea of the Serbs was to drive the Yugoslavs under the Karađorđević dynasty. An idea that 
the representatives of Croatian and Slovenian exile seemed willing to accept, but that would 
definitely put out of action the interests of the Montenegrin monarchy. This possibility was 
viewed with particular alarm by King Nikola, who had already tried to raise awareness among 
the Entente governments of the danger posed by a Serbian hegemony on Yugoslav peoples.60 
The Montenegrin king also tried to persuade Sonnino that using adequate amounts of money it 
was possible to enable the representatives of the Yugoslav movement against the Serbs.61 This 
hypothesis, however, soon appeared unlikely given the results of the Corfu meetings, when 
Croatian, Serbs and Slovenes representatives agreed on the formula, supported in particular by 
Trumbić, of “one people with three names”.62 
                                                          
57 For the consequences of the Proclamation on the Italian-Montenegrin relations see F. Le Moal, La France et Italie 
dans les Balkans 1914-1919. Le contentieux adriatique, Hartmattan, Paris 2006, pp. 228-229. 
58 See V.S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe 1914-1918. A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and 
Propaganda, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1957; L.E. Gelfand, The Inquiry American Preparation for 
Peace, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 1963. 
59 I. Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins History, Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1988, 
pp. 122-123; I.J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study in Frontiermaking, Yale University 
Press, New Haven 1963, p. 25. 
60 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. VII, doc. 284. 
61 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. VIII, docs. 77, 158. 
62 Ivi, docs. 446, 456, 609. 
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On 20 July 1917, the Corfu Declaration proposed in fact for the first time the real possibility of a 
Yugoslav state under the Karađorđević.63 For the declaration had not bid Montenegrin delegates, 
a few days later, the Unionists led by Radović stated that Montenegro, exhausted its historical 
function, was ready to join a kingdom of Serbians, Croatians and Slovenians.64  
Sonnino’s reaction to these events could only be negative, with a renewed support for King 
Nikola, also through new funds and renewed pressure on the allies to affirm the principle of 
Montenegrin independence.65 This line, however, could not guarantee a positive result, given the 
difficulties in defending the King and the role that France was assuming in the Balkan policy. 
Nikola’s expressions of sympathy for the Yugoslav cause, actually merely instrumental 
declarations in defense of its own dynastic interests, did nothing but cause further irritation in 
Sonnino.66 In fact, King Nikola continued to support the idea of freedom for Yugoslav peoples 
outside Serbian hegemony and remained highly critical toward Pašić and Trumbić.67 In the same 
days, in an attempt to counter the growing Yugoslav propaganda, the foreign minister of 
Montenegro met with the US ambassador in Paris, William G. Sharp, to which asked American 
backing.68 In the following months, Nikola continued to have sporadic contact with the allied 
representatives, but in fact, even when Lloyd George on 5 January 1918 made reference to the 
restoration of Montenegro, this was less a generic statement of the war aims than an indication of 
a clear commitment to the future of that country.69 In the case of the United States, the situation 
was even more difficult considering that in his Address delivered on 8 January at a joint session 
of the two Houses of Congress, Wilson had referred to the evacuation of the Austro-Hungarian 
forces from Montenegro, although without mentioning the future status of the country.70 
Nevertheless, thanks to the Italian pressures towards the end of 1917, official contacts had been 
established between the US and Montenegrin government in exile. Italians had in fact asked the 
                                                          
63 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, cit., pp. 123-125; Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace 
Conference, cit., pp. 25-26.  
64 AMAE, Guerre Mondiale, 331, Delaroche-Vernet à Ribot, Neuilly 17 agosto 1917.  
65 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. IX, docs. 128, 275. 
66 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. XI, doc. 331. 
67 Ivi, docs. 464, 482. 
68 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1917, Supplement 2, The World War, vol. I, 
United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1917-1919, p.146.  
69 FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, The World War, vol. I, p. 8.  
70 Ivi, p. 15. 
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State Department to grant the establishment of a Montenegrin legation in Washington, 
anticipating an official request by the Montenegrins to Sharp. The response of the American 
secretary of state Lansing was positive, albeit founded on a degree of caution, waiting to see first 
how the British Government intended to act.71 
However, the time for the government in exile was to expire, given the growing wire of 
Yugoslav propaganda and its many supporters in America. As it is clear from the reports of the 
US representative in Corfu, Percival H. Dodge, there was no doubt about the intentions of the 
Serbs with respect to the future arrangement of Montenegro.72  
The End of Montenegrin Independence 
The end of WWI for Montenegro merges with the broader Adriatic question. This is not only 
related to the Italian eastern border and the fate of Albania, but actually at least partly to the 
future of Montenegro as well. If it was already evident in the final stages of the War that 
Montenegro had few chances to maintain its independence, in the early months of 1919 the 
Italian government still thought possible to use somehow the Montenegrins to embarrass 
Belgrade. 
In September 1918, in view of the promising developments of the Balkan front, King Nikola 
began to think about the establishment of a Montenegrin Legion to be sent to the front. This 
initiative was at first received with interest by the Italians but openly opposed by the French 
government.73 Given the clear position of Paris on this issue, however, Rome opposed as well to 
avoid unnecessary friction with the French.74 Nevertheless, Sonnino was determined to do 
everything in his power not to benefit the unionist’s cause, also trying to get the support of Great 
Britain and the United States to prevent the demise of Montenegro.75 
The attitude of the Paris government against Nikola was now practically hostile, with the 
interruption of any subsidy and the ban imposed on the king to leave France, while the 
                                                          
71 Ivi, pp. 785-786. As ambassador to Washington will finally be appointed General Gvosdenović. Ivi, p. 787. 
72 Ivi, pp. 827-831. 
73 Archivio Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore Esercito (AUSSME), F-1 Comando Supremo – Vari Uffici, 45/10, 
Missione Militare Italiana in Francia – Ufficio del Capo Missione, n. 4537, Montenegro (Riservatissimo), 23 
settembre 1918.  
74 DDI, Quinta Serie, vol. XI, docs. 518, 559. 
75 Ivi, docs. 705, 779. 
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Yugoslavist movement was gaining new strength. In a memorandum submitted in October, 
Trumbić, after having boasted the unanimity of popular support for Yugoslavism, openly urged 
the US government to support the Yugoslav’s cause against Italy, claiming that 
America must offer her protection to the Yugoslavs in accordance to the principles laid down by 
President Wilson, in accordance to its traditions and against the imperialistic pretention of 
Italy.76 
Obviously in this view there was no room for an independent Montenegro, nor for any 
interpretation that went beyond the uniform acceptance of the Belgrade leadership. 
In the meantime, allied troops on Macedonian front had managed to break through the enemy 
defenses starting an unstoppable advance that eventually ended the war in the Balkans. With the 
advance through Kosovo and the Sandzak of Novi Pazar the Army of the Orient of General 
Franchet d’Esperèy prepared to enter northern Albania and Montenegro. While in Paris the 
Allies were seeking a solution to the division of occupation zones, the various contingents in the 
field put into practice a race to the actual conquest of the territory.77 At the forefront of the 
French and Serbian forces were bands of komitađi, which established a first contact with 
Montenegrin population playing a leading role in the affirmation of Serbian authority. 
Meanwhile, the Italian Chief of Staff, General Armando Diaz, ordered the Italian troops to 
participate in the occupation of Montenegro along with French and English forces, but only after 
previous agreements with General Franchet d’Esperèy.78 However, on 6 November 1918, 
Sonnino stated that these directives did not exclude the Italian troops entering Montenegro also 
without the participation of other allied forces.79 Though Italian troops occupied Ulcinj, Bar and 
Vir Pazar, which eventually became inter-Allied garrisons under Italian command, occupations 
performed by the Serbs and the pro-Yugoslav attitude of the French military already outlined an 
attempt to create a de facto situation and the likely defeat of the Legitimists.80 With the Austrian 
surrender it was also occupied Kotar, while the attempt to reach Cetinje was halted by Serb and 
                                                          
76 FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, The World War, vol. I, p. 866. 
77 DDI, Sesta Serie, vol. I, docs. 13, 14, 25.  
78 Ivi, doc. 7. 
79 Ivi, doc. 31. 
80 AUSSME, F-1, 45/9, Direttive occupazione Montenegro (1918). 
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Montenegrin unionists forces.81 A few days later, involving a US detachment, a new attempt was 
put in place but failed causing a minor diplomatic incident. The Italian Minister President, 
Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, however, was opposed to further occupations in Montenegro in 
order to avoid unnecessary disputes with the Serbs, preferring to seek the consent of the other 
powers, especially Washington. These hopes proved futile due to the favor with which Wilson 
looked to Yugoslavia’s cause, as also demonstrated the disappointing results of King Nikola’s 
appeals to the American president.82 
Meanwhile, the Serbs had acted rapidly. On 15 October 1918 Belgrade organized a Central 
Executive Committee for Unification of Serbia and Montenegro to schedule the unification 
process; with this decision Serbia abolished the legal Montenegrin parliament. Moreover, on 25 
October the committee had decided to schedule a nationwide election with new election laws, to 
form a parliament to decide the form and process of unification of Montenegro with Serbia. The 
methods of this election were openly contested by the Montenegrin government in exiles as well 
as from many others in the country. With the war drawing to a close, there were various 
initiatives to formalize unification and organize various assemblies in the areas under Serbian 
control. Among them, the Great National Assembly of the Serb People in Montenegro, also 
known as the Podgorica Assembly, organized on 24 November 1918 by a Serbian government 
committee.83 At this time, in Montenegro there were two parties, known as the Greens and the 
Whites, in favor of a confederation and unification, indeed annexation to Serbia, respectively.  
In the Assembly the two opposite sides of White and Greens were both but not equally 
represented.84 Hence, some of the members demanded that Montenegro’s independence be 
restored prior to any discussion about union with Serbia. This proposal was refused by the 
president of the Assembly Savo Cerović; thus on 26 November it was unanimously adopted a 
                                                          
81 Ivi, 45/8, Regio Esercito Italiano – Comando Supremo – Ufficio Operazioni, Intervento delle truppe americane in 
Montenegro. 
82 In a note of December 10, the Montenegrins openly accused Belgrade of wanting to exclude the Montenegrin 
representatives from the forthcoming Peace Conference. DDI, Sesta Serie, vol. I, doc. 514. 
83 Cfr. S. Pavlović, Balkan Anschluss: The Annexation of Montenegro and the Creation of the Common South Slavic 
State, Purdue University Press, West Lafayette 2008; Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, cit., pp. 284-286. 
84 The Whites won at all locations except Cetinje, but in Bijelo Polje, Plav and Gusinje the electors were actually 
appointed by the local community, and never properly repeated. 
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resolution deposing King Nikola and his dynasty from the throne, and the merging of 
Montenegro with the Kingdom of Serbia.85 
The Parliament continued its session until 29 November 1918, when a five members Central 
Montenegrin Committee for Unification was appointed.86 The Assembly convened for the last 
time on 27 December 1919 to elect the Montenegrin delegation to the Collective National 
Representing Body of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that was to draft the new 
Constitution. 
Nikola and his Government in exile in Neuilly discarded these decisions, as illegal, and called 
forth the Montenegrins not to accept the annexation.  
On 1 December 1918, it was proclaimed birth of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
while Italy began to openly consider arming and supporting the Greens. Italy’s support of the 
January uprising was eventually seen as part of a larger military and diplomatic effort to stretch 
the already frail newly created Kingdom of SHS in order to make it easier for Rome to dispute its 
undefined and internationally unrecognized borders. This is not to deny that there was an 
independence party in Montenegro willing to fight against the union with Serbia.  
In January 1919, the French newspapers favorable to Serbia published the Belgrade’s note, 
announcing the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in addition to the 
decadence of the Montenegrin dynasty; news that was accepted with no critics in Paris and 
Washington.87 Meanwhile, in Cetinje some anti-Serbian groups were organizing to oppose the 
country’s dependence from Belgrade and demanding for an inter-allied occupation. This, 
however, did not constitute a threat to the Serbs that now had full control of the country.88 
Notwithstanding, the unrest eventually led to a real uprising when the Greens, led by Krsto 
Zrnov Popović and Jovan S. Plamenac, supported by the Italians, resorted to rebellion in an 
attempt to restore independent Montenegro. The Christmas Uprising occurred in and around the 
                                                          
85 On the Podgorica Assembly see FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. II, pp. 349-351.  
86 Moreover, on 17 December 1918, the Assembly members sent a copy of the Montenegrin Crown to King Petar I 
Karađorđević with a delegation that went to Belgrade led by Metropolitan Gavrilo. 
87 On the reactions of American diplomacy see FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. II, 355-366. 
88 S. Pavlović, Balkan Anschluss: The Annexation of Montenegro and the Creation of the Common South Slavic 
State, Purdue University Press, West Lafayette 2008. 
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town of Cetinje on 6-7 January 1919. Though the rebels had some thousand armed men, the 
Serbian Army quelled the rebellion in blood, isolating Cetinje and Nikšić.89 
On 7 February, through a statement by the Secretary of State, the United States recognized the 
union of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.90 A few days later, the State Department communicated to 
the ambassador of Serbia to have taken note of the establishment of a Montenegrin Grand 
National Assembly and the deposition of Nikola and his dynasty, accepting without comment 
what happened in Podgorica.91 Meanwhile, all attempts by the government in exile to be credited 
at the Peace Conference were unsuccessful.92 The US government also received protests from 
Montenegrin groups hostile to union with Serbia. Nevertheless, when King Nikola asked for a 
meeting with Wilson, the President refused on the advice of Lansing, stating that “it would be 
unwise at the present time to have an interview with him”.93 In fact, the US government had 
already decided to support the Yugoslavs and all communications that did not correspond with 
the ideal image presented by Belgrade were simply ignored.94 
At this point the Americans proposed the withdrawal of allied contingents from Montenegro to 
let people decide freely of their destiny; a solution which, however, would have simply left free 
hand to the Serbs and that the Italian government objected, asking instead for the withdrawal of 
Serbian troops and the return of King Nikola.95 The British had doubts about the proposed 
withdrawal as well, probably fearing the violence that would follow.96 However, Paris and 
London were against the return of Nikola. In late February it was reached a vague agreement on 
the evacuation and in March, the US contingent withdrew from Kotor, while the Italians refused 
to leave the country in the absence of a general agreement. Only after the French decision to 
leave Kotor, the Italians began to withdraw their own garrisons from Montenegro. The departure 
of the French marked the end of the inter-allied command in Kotor and the effective isolation of 
                                                          
89 Some form of little guerrilla resistance continued until 1926. 
90 FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, The World War, vol. II, p. 899. 
91 Ivi, pp. 899-900. 
92 FRUS, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. I, pp. 254-255. In fact the admission of Montenegro to the 
Conference was the center of many doubts but very few serious discussions, considering what was happening in the 
country. Ivi, pp. 308, 387, 393, 398. 
93 Ivi, pp. 368-370. 
94 Ivi, pp. 371-372. 
95 DDI, Sesta Serie, vol. II, doc. 210, 253. 
96 Ivi, doc. 320.  
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the Italians. Nevertheless, at least until September 1919, the Italian Ministry of War was still 
contrary to the withdrawal from the Montenegrin port. 
In addition, Italians had planned the return in Montenegro of men loyal to Nikola to counter the 
Unionists, thus opening a new political game, which characterized the weeks following the end 
of the War and that with ups and downs lasted throughout 1919-1920, when there were still some 
clashes between Serbs and Montenegrins.97 On 24 February 1920 the Italian Minister President 
Nitti proposed without success to the allies to discuss the situation in Montenegro, defending its 
right to independence against the excessive power of Belgrade.98 It was a rearguard action with 
well little chance of success as evidenced by the French decision of June 1920 to close its 
embassy in Cetinje.99 
It is however important to note that still on 18 September, 1920, for the forthcoming election of 
the Constituent Assembly of the Kingdom of SHS, the British representative in Belgrade Alban 
Young, wrote to the British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon considering advisable to reaffirm that 
“The union with Montenegro was not in the eyes of the Powers such an established fact as the 
new Electoral Law presumed, and that some exigencies of our own might have to be met”. 
Actually however, Young had not received clear instructions from London on how to address the 
Montenegrin issue, if not the declared intention of Curzon to support free elections. In his 
analysis of the situation Young was able to grasp all the issues related to the forthcoming 
Constituent Assembly and the future of Montenegro, and concluded his report by stating that 
I must confess that the Constituent Assembly seems to me to contain potentialities of violent 
discord, and given the nature of the different peoples who will be represented in it, I should think 
that the only safe method of avoiding a lapse in anarchy will be for the responsible leaders to 
force through a practically agreed scheme. 
                                                          
97 AUSSME, F-1, 45/10, Insurrezioni in Montenegro. 
98 Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), First Series 1919-1925, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London 
1944-1958, First Series, vol. VII, doc. 24 and Appendix 2 to no. 24. 
99 DDF, 1920, Tome II, doc. 154. 
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I must once again earnestly express my opinion that if we want peace in this corner of Europe we 
should abstain from enquiring too closely into the extent to which the democratic principles of 
free elections and self-determination are applied in practice. 100 
Curzon’s answer came on October 29, with a note announcing the result of conversations that 
took place in London with the Yugoslav representative, from which emerged the decision of the 
British government not to create additional obstacles to the solution of the Montenegrin issue 
once provided adequate guarantees on the democracy of the electoral process. This position was, 
however, to deal with the effective action of the Yugoslav authorities in Montenegro, despite the 
proposals to send an international commission to verify the proper conduct of the elections. In a 
few words, Curzon wanted guarantees on the democratic nature of the elections and the process 
of unification, before officially recognizing the demise of Montenegro.101 This position 
corresponded, at least formally, to Italy’s legitimist line, which obviously had very different 
purposes, but as far as we can recognize, a general interest in compliance with the Montenegrin 
rights. 
The independence of Montenegro was not officially recognized by the Powers until 1922. During 
this period, annexation was supported by Paris and Washington, and independence by Rome, 
while London was somewhat ambivalent, suppressing reports about method practiced by Serbia, 
and backed by French officers, to fight the Greens. The real conclusion of the Montenegrin issue 
were however to come only in 1921 with the death of King Nikola and the signing of the Treaty 
of Rapallo which provided a solution to the troubled Italian-Yugoslav relations, therefore 
eliminating the last obstacle to the general recognition of the Serbian supremacy in the Yugoslav 
space. 
 
 
 
                                                          
100 DBFP, First Series, vol. XII, doc. 399. 
101 Ivi, doc. 424. 
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